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Reviving the Right to Vote
ELLEN D. KATZ*
I. INTRODUCTION

Losers in partisan districting battles have long challenged the resulting
districting plans under seemingly unrelated legal doctrines. They have filed
lawsuits alleging malapportionment, racial gerrymandering, and racial vote
dilution, and they periodically prevail.' Many election law scholars worry
about these lawsuits, claiming that they needlessly "racialize" fundamentally
political disputes, distort important legal doctrines designed for other
purposes, and provide an inadequate remedy for a fundamentally distinct
2
electoral problem.
I am not convinced. This Article argues that the application of distinct
doctrines to invalidate or diminish what are indisputably partisan
gerrymanders is not necessarily problematic, and that the practice may well
have salutary effects. The argument is premised both on the belief that the
Court was right to reject the recent challenges to partisan gerrymandering as
well as the conviction that a workable principle to restrain the practice awaits
implementation.
This Article focuses on LULAC v. Perry,3 the most recent example of the
sort of judicial decision about which election law scholars fret. Unable to
articulate any constitutional problem with a blatant partisan gerrymander in
Texas, the Supreme Court found traction under the Voting Rights Act (VRA)
and held that a portion of that gerrymander diluted minority voting strength
in the southwest portion of the state. 4 More specifically, the Court held that
Texas violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act when it displaced nearly
100,000 Latino residents from a congressional district in Laredo to protect the
5
Republican incumbent they refused to support.
Texas' foray into "re-redistricting" was, of course, a patently partisan
affair. Still, the state pursued its plan through race-based districting moves
that relied on the close connection between race and party in Texas. In this
*

Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.

See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2605
(2006) [hereinafter LULAC]; Karcher v. Dagget, 462 U.S. 725, 727 (1983); Vieth v.
Pennsylvania, 195 F. Supp. 2d 672, 679 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
2 See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, Cultural Compactness, 105 MICH. L. REv. FIRST
IMPRESsIONS 48, 49 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/voll05/
ortiz.pdf; Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial
Review of PoliticalGerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 543, 569 (2004); Kathleen M.
Sullivan & Pamela S. Karlan, The Elysian Fields of the Law, 57 STAN. L. REv. 695, 70910(2004).
3 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
4 Id. at 2623.
5
Id.
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context, the resulting claims of race-based injury are hardly an ancillary
distraction obscuring the core dispute, but, instead, a predictable consequence
of the gerrymander itself.
As important, however, is the extent to which the Court's concern about
partisan gerrymandering and, in particular, the relentless pursuit of
incumbency protection, both propelled and shaped the race-based injury the
Justices identified. LULAC viewed Laredo's Latino community as cohesive
and discrete in the traditional sense, but also observed that the community
was "politically active" and engaged. This political engagement existed
because the district had been competitive prior to redistricting. In my view, it
was this political engagement, made possible by a competitive forum, that,
for the Court, ultimately made the political influence of Laredo's Latino
voters worth protecting.
It is also what distinguished Latino voters in Laredo from AfricanAmerican voters in Fort Worth. There, the Court let stand the dismantling of
a so-called coalition district in which black voters comprising less than half
the district's electorate claimed to control electoral outcomes. 6 In Justice
Kennedy's controlling view, the pervasive lack of competition in Fort Worth
meant that meaningful voter preferences could neither be expressed nor
ascertained, and thus that the state's dismantling of this district could not
dilute minority voting strength in any measurable way.7 Because Fort Worth
lacked the vibrancy manifest in Laredo, the state's decision to splinter the
Fort Worth district caused no representational harm and thus was immune
from attack under Section 2.8
By protecting Latino voters in Laredo but denying relief to black voters
in Fort Worth, LULAC suggests that minority voters might have a protected
right to participate in a competitive political environment but not in a noncompetitive one. This suggestion, if the Court develops it, represents a
dramatically new approach to minority voting rights, one that shifts Section
2's present focus on electoral outcomes to one directed at the electoral
process itself. As such, it all but repudiates traditional efforts to insulate
cohesive minority groups from political competition. If Section 2 no longer
protected minority influence in noncompetitive districts, many fewer
districting decisions would be subject to statutory challenge.
I am nevertheless inclined to welcome the move. Redefining the type of
race-based community entitled to statutory protection enabled a Court long
wary of Section 2 to identify for the first time at least one race-based
community that warrants statutory protection. 9 By so doing, the Court
6 Id. at 2626.

7 Id. at 2625.

8Id.
9 See Ellen D. Katz, From Laredo to Fort Worth: Race, Politics, and the Texas
Redistricting Case, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 38, 38 (2006),
http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol 105/katz.pdf.
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necessarily acknowledged that race need not be a problem to overcome but
can be a trait that unites people in positive ways and gives rise to
communities of value. That is hardly an inconsequential acknowledgement
given how often the Court has invalidated state efforts to create and foster
racially-defined political communities. 1 0 And it is an acknowledgement that
takes on added importance now that substantial challenges are pending to the
validity of the renewed VRA," and principled ones remain possible against
12
Section 2 itself.
As a normative matter, moreover, making racial vote dilution contingent
on competitive elections might just be a constructive development. Racial
vote dilution has traditionally been remedied (or avoided) through the
creation of a majority-minority district. These invariably safe Democratic
districts have been the subject of much criticism, some celebration, and a
sustained debate as to their value as vehicles for minority political
representation. 13 And yet, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court ever
meant for the majority-minority district to be the exclusive or even the
preferred remedy for racial vote dilution under Section 2.14 Thornburg v.
Gingles, the authority often cited for the contrary proposition, held only that
the failure to create such a district in specified circumstances informs the
question of liability under Section 2.15 Gingles said nothing about how
violations of Section 2 might be remedied.
To be sure, the majority-minority district offers a remedy for racial vote
dilution. It allows for minority influence when voting is racially polarized,
and, as some studies suggest, provides a venue that itself erodes racial
polarization among voters. 16 But because a majority-minority district is also
invariably a noncompetitive district, it offers a form of political participation
10

See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 499 (2000); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 927-28 (1995). LULAC v. Perry did so as well. See LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2619
(regarding District 25).
11 See Complaint at 5, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Gonzales, No. 1:06-cv01384-PLF (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2006).
12 See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power to
Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts,

101 MICH. L. REV. 2341, 2403-05 (2003).
13 See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE
LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 832-33 (2d

rev. ed.

2001).

14

The 2006 renewal of the Voting Rights Act adds language to Section 5 meant to
require the maintenance of such districts as a means to avoid retrogression, but left
Section 2 unchanged. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting
Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5(3),
120 Stat. 577, 580-81 (2006).
15 Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
16 See, e.g., DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION: THE
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS 204-05, 261 (1999).
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(as related to but ultimately distinct from the form of political representation)
about which we should be wary, particularly when the absence of
competition seeps into the primary itself.
A competitive process vests in every voter the potential to be the coveted
swing voter, the one whose support candidates most seek, the one for whom
they modify policy proposals and offer the political spoils that generate
loyalty.' 7 A competitive electoral district helps overcome traditional barriers
to minority political participation by giving candidates reason to court
minority voters. Such a district, be it single or multi-member, 18 accordingly
holds promise as a means to destabilize racial bloc voting. It offers an
attractive alternative to the majority-minority district as a means to remedy
racial vote dilution. After all, minority voters might just be best served by a
political arena in which politicians actually vie for their votes.
But so would all of us. 19 LULAC's suggestion that competition gives rise
to political participation worth protecting under Section 2 invites articulation
of a broader principle: namely, that the right to vote must encompass
something more than the ability to cast a ballot for a preordained victor. In
LULAC and other cases, the Court appropriately pushed back challenges
brought by partisan losers claiming entitlement to a greater share of the
districting spoils. LULAC's Section 2 analysis, however, offers something
more workable and more palatable. The decision rests on a nascent
conception of political harm experienced by all voters-regardless of racewhen a political system is rigged to block competition.
II. REDEFINING RACIAL VOTE DILUTION
Section 2 of the VRA is a difficult statutory provision. Thirteen related
but distinct factors presently inform its application, with no single factor
carrying dispositive weight, and several requiring a host of subsidiary
findings. 20 An absence of discriminatory intent does not ensure statutory
17 Ellen D. Katz, Resurrecting the White Primary, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 325-26
(2004).
18 Such districts could be single or multi-member, so long as the latter operate
without the accompanying features (i.e., anti-single shot, majority vote, and numbered
place requirements) that historically eliminated minority influence in at-large systems.
See generally Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting
Racial and Language Minorities, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990 21 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds.,
1994).
19 But see Nathaniel Persily, In Defense ofFoxes GuardingHenhouses: The Casefor
Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARv. L. REV. 649,
650 (2002) (challenging notion that noncompetitive districts are problematic).
20
See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,
206-07 (listing seven factors plus two additional concerns that bear on the inquiry);
Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1000 (1993) (articulating concept of proportionality
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compliance, nor does the provision of unimpeded access to the ballot box.
Equality of opportunity to participate in the political process is promised, but
whatever that means, it explicitly does not encompass a right to proportional
21
representation.
Compounding these difficulties is the disfavored status of the dominant
remedy for adjudicated Section 2 violations. The majority-minority district is
an entity that the Court at its most optimistic believes represents "the politics
of second best," and which various Justices condemn as a balkanizing and
essentializing device. 22 As this latter characterization suggests, Section 2
presents a host of nontrivial constitutional concerns, ranging from the equal
protection issues that inhere in the official race-based considerations Section
2 mandates, to the questions about congressional power raised by a statute
23
that proscribes a vast range of constitutional conduct.
Given these facets of Section 2, a seasoned Court watcher (including one
who attended the oral argument in LULAC) might not have predicted that
five Justices would find that Texas violated Section 2 when it split the city of
Laredo between two congressional districts. More anticipated was the Court's
decision to let stand the state's dismantling of a so-called coalition district in
Fort Worth, but here, too, the rationale set forth in Justice Kennedy's
controlling opinion is surprising and demands explanation.
A. What ' Wrong With Henry Bonilla?
The LULAC majority held that the splitting of Laredo violated Section 2
because of a confluence of factors. These factors include the "long history of
discrimination against Latinos" in Texas, both in the electoral arena and in
socio-economic realms, 24 a diminished capacity to participate in the political
process because of this historic discrimination,2 5 the political cohesiveness of
Laredo's Latino community, 26 the "unresponsive[ness]" of Representative

as part of the Section 2 inquiry); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51 (setting forth three
preconditions to a Section 2 inquiry).
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
22 See, e.g., Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1020 (noting that such districts rely on "the
'politics of second best"') (quoting BERNARD GROFMAN, LISA HANDLEY & RICHARD G.
NrEMI, MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 136 (1992));

Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
23 See Katz, ReinforcingRepresentation,supra note 12, at 2403.
24
LULAC, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2622 (2006) (quoting Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d
451, 473 (E.D. Tex. 2004)).
25 Id. ("[T]he 'political, social, and economic legacy of past discrimination' for
Latinos in Texas ... may well 'hinder their ability to participate effectively in the
political process."') (quoting Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 492; Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30, 45 (1986)).
26

See id. at 2621-23.
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Henry Bonilla to Latino interests in Laredo, 27 and the state's "tenuous"

28
justification for splitting the city between two congressional districts.

Justice Kennedy analyzed each of these factors in a markedly pro-plaintiff
manner, resisting the tendency of various lower court judges to read the
Section 2 factors narrowly.
Justice Kennedy, for example, credited as probative of historic
discrimination against Latinos in Texas a list of long defunct practices
"stretching back to Reconstruction"--practices such as the poll tax, the white
primary, and restrictive registration periods. 29 A number of lower courts, by
contrast, have disregarded evidence of far more recent acts of official
discrimination on the ground that the events were "too remote in time," 30 and
were no longer prevalent. 3 1 So too, Justice Kennedy found that the "political,
social, and economic legacy of past discrimination" against Latinos in Texas
"may well hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political
process." 32 Several lower courts, however, have refused to link past
discrimination to the present inability of Latino plaintiffs to participate
effectively, reasoning that contemporary electoral difficulties Latino voters
confront stem, at least in part, from conditions in Mexico and other foreign
countries. 33
27 Id. at 2622 ("Latinos' diminishing electoral support for Bonilla indicates their
belief he was 'unresponsive to [their] particularized needs ...')(quoting Gingles, 478
U.S. at 45).
28
Id.at 2623.
29
Id.at 2622 (quoting Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1317 (S.D. Tex. 1994)).
30
See, e.g., Barnett v. City of Chicago, 969 E Supp. 1359, 1446 (N.D. Ill. 1997); see
also Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 832 (6th Cir. 1998).
31 See, e.g., Vecinos de Barrio Uno v. City of Holyoke, 960 F. Supp. 515, 526
(D. Mass. 1997) ("The 1995 election witnessed the complete absence of election-related
problems that plagued elections in the 1980's."); Washington v. Tensas Parish Sch. Bd.,
819 F.2d 609, 612 (5th Cir. 1987); Monroe v. City of Woodville, 688 E Supp. 255, 260
(S.D. Miss. 1988); Latino Political Action Comm., Inc. v. City of Boston, 609 E Supp.
739, 745 (D. Mass. 1985). See also Barnett,969 F. Supp. at 1449; Solomon v. Liberty
County, 957 F. Supp. 1522, 1565 (N.D. Fla. 1997); Reed v. Town of Babylon, 914 F.
Supp. 843, 889 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Sanchez v. Colorado, 861 E Supp. 1516, 1529
(D. Colo. 1994); NAACP v. City of Columbia, 850 F. Supp. 404, 424 (D.S.C. 1993);
Brown v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 722 F. Supp. 380, 396 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); Sierra v. El Paso
Indep. Sch. Dist., 591 F. Supp. 802, 810 (W.D. Tex. 1984).
32
LULAC, 126 S.Ct. at 2622 (internal citations omitted).
33 See, e.g., Perez v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 958 F. Supp. 1196, 1225 (S.D. Tex.
1997) ('The socioeconomic data ...does not distinguish between Hispanics who are
recent immigrants and those who have been in this country for longer periods,
particularly those who are citizens."); Aldasoro v. Kennerson, 922 F. Supp. 339, 365
(S.D. Cal. 1995) ("Hispanics are characterized by lower socioeconomic status than
Anglos, but many Hispanics in El Centro have immigrated recently from Mexico, a third
world country, and naturally are characterized by lower socioeconomic status....
Therefore, it is critical to distinguish between foreign born and native born Hispanics in
addressing this Senate factor. Plaintiffs' evidence failed to make this distinction.");
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Justice Kennedy's opinion credited both a history of past discrimination
and its contemporary deleterious effect, notwithstanding his observation that
Latino voters in Laredo had been "politically active, with a marked and
continuous rise in Spanish-surnamed voter registration." 34 Lower courts have
relied on registration and turnout statistics to dismiss past discrimination, be
it political or socio-economic, as inconsequential. 35 Justice Kennedy, by
contrast, declined to equate unimpeded access to the ballot box with full
political participation.
Justice Kennedy did not discount evidence that voting is racially
polarized in southwestern Texas even though partisanship contributed to
Anglo support for (and Latino opposition to) Laredo Representative Henry
Bonilla.36 Nor did Justice Kennedy reflexively uphold incumbency
protection as a legitimate justification for a challenged district, as some lower
courts have done. 37 Instead, LULAC is one of the rare Section 2 cases to
deem the policy underlying a challenged practice to be tenuous, here on the
ground that the pursuit of incumbency protection diluted minority voting
38
strength.
Finally, Justice Kennedy labeled Representative Bonilla unresponsive to
Latino interests based on the simple fact that Latino voters did not support
him. 3 9 Lower courts have infrequently found elected representatives
unresponsive, particularly absent evidence of affirmative discrimination
Sierra, 591 F. Supp. at 807, 809-10 (finding discrepancies in socioeconomic status
between Hispanics and whites, but holding that "the record fails to show how many of
those affected by unemployment are recent immigrants or resident aliens as opposed to
citizens" as well as that "[tihe evidence... fails to show how many residents of South El
Paso were educated (or not educated) in Mexico rather than in the United States").
34
LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2621.
35 See Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discriminationin Voting: Judicial Findings
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 643, 676
n. 173 (2006) (citing cases).
36
LULAC, 126 S.Ct. at 2615 (noting voting was racially polarized).
37
Id. at 2622. Cf Prejean v. Foster, 83 F. App'x 5, 11 (5th Cir. 2003); McMillan v.
Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1245 (5th Cir. 1981); Fund for Accurate and Informed
Representation, Inc. v. Weprin, 796 F. Supp. 662, 670, 672 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
38
LULAC, 126 S.Ct. at 2623. Cf Ellen D. Katz, Not Like the South? Regional
Variation and PoliticalParticipationthrough the Lens of Section 2, in VOTING RIGHTS
ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND
POWER 183, 216 tbl.8.2 (Ana Henderson ed., Berkeley Public Policy Press 2007) (chart
documenting that 23 (7%) of the 331 published Section 2 lawsuits have deemed the
policy underlying
a challenged
policy to
be tenuous),
available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/centers/ewi/researchVotingRights.html. Some lower courts
have declared incumbency protection a tenuous policy in this circumstance. See, e.g.,
Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1408 (7th Cir. 1984); Black Political Task Force v.
Galvin, 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 313 (D. Mass. 2004); Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp.
345, 374 (E.D.N.C. 1984); Buskey v. Oliver, 565 F. Supp. 1473, 1483 (M.D. Ala. 1983).
39
LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2622.
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directed at the minority community. Justice Kennedy nevertheless easily
appends the label, relying on a novel and expansive measure of
unresponsiveness that dispenses with the examination of substantive policy
40
and constituent access that lower courts have used to assess responsiveness.
Read together, these findings render Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
in LULAC a vigorous application of Section 2 in Laredo. To be sure, the
analysis is hardly unprecedented (with the exception of the designation of
Representative Bonilla as unresponsive based solely on electoral returns), and
for every lower court that grudgingly applied the Section 2 factors, others
have read them in the more plaintiff-friendly manner employed by Justice
Kennedy. Even so, Justice Kennedy's willingness to do so is surprising,
particularly given the wariness with which the Court has viewed Section 2,
and the skepticism that Justice Kennedy in particular has expressed about the
41
statute.
Lower courts have resisted broad readings of the Section 2 factors for
many reasons, but a persistent and animating concern has been the belief that
the statute, vigorously applied, necessarily devolves into a mandate for
proportional representation based on race. The Chief Justice famously raised
this concern back in 1982 when, as a young attorney in the Reagan Justice
Department, he opposed amending Section 2 to create a results-based test for
42
discrimination in voting.
Roberts's position, of course, did not carry the day.43 But the concern he
raised persisted because Section 2, as amended, eliminated the two most
obvious ways to guard against proportional representation: namely, by
cabining the statute's reach to those practices that were motivated by
discriminatory intent or that impeded access to the ballot box. The 1982
amendment to Section 2 made clear that intent is not a component of the
44
statutory injury.
The fear that Section 2, as amended, would functionally (if not formally)
mandate proportional representation has led dozens of federal courts to
interpret Section 2 in a manner more consistent with the legal regime Roberts
40

Katz, Not Like the South?, supra note 38, at 216 tbl.8.2 (documenting that 20 of
the 331 published Section 2 lawsuits documented a lack of responsiveness).
41 See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1028-29 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 418 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
42 Memorandum from John Roberts on Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to the
Attorney General (Dec. 22, 1981), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/johnroberts/accession-60-88-0498 (Roberts argued that moving to a results-based ban would
inevitably lead federal courts to invalidate any electoral system that is not neatly tailored
to achieve proportional representation along racial lines. The consequence would be "a
quota system for electoral politics.").
43 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
44 Cf Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 387, 399 (S.D. Ala. 1976)
(observing that African-American voters in Mobile lacked "full voting rights,"
notwithstanding their ability to "register and vote without hindrance").
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sought than with the one Congress enacted. They have done so not through
express holding, but instead through narrow constructions of the factors
comprising the Section 2 inquiry. They have, for instance, discounted
evidence of past discrimination when it fails to link the named defendants
with acts of intentional discrimination, because, for instance, the
discrimination took place long ago or in another jurisdiction; they have also
deemed past discrimination inconsequential when minority residents "register
45
and vote without hindrance.
Some language in Justice Kennedy's LULAC opinion seems consistent
with this approach. While Section 2 prohibits electoral practices that impair
minority political participation regardless of the underlying motivation,
Justice Kennedy expressly notes that the Laredo district "bears the mark of
intentional discrimination. '4 6 Insofar as this characterization was critical to
the Court's holding, LULAC would seemingly do no more than affirm the
incontrovertible proposition that the state may not intentionally impair
minority political participation.
I think LULAC does more. Justice Kennedy describes in detail how the
new boundary affected political participation in Laredo's Latino community.
Latino "voters were poised to elect their candidate of choice," 4 7 and the state
"made fruitless the Latinos' mobilization efforts." 48 Latino voters were
"cohesive," and "politically active," a fact Justice Kennedy thought so
important that he mentioned it four separate times. 4 9 And Justice Kennedy
explicitly wrote that "the State must be held accountable for the effect of [its
50
districting] choices in denying equal opportunity to Latino voters."
The heated dispute between the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy
regarding District 25 makes clear that LULAC's holding did not hinge on
discriminatory motivation. District 25 was the so-called "bacon strip" district
that linked Latino voters on the Mexican border with those living hundreds of
miles away in Austin. Texas argued that the Voting Rights Act required the
creation of a district like District 25 to compensate for the displacement of
Latino voters in Laredo. 51 Justice Kennedy found this substitute insufficient
given that it sought to unite "far-flung segments of a racial group with
disparate interests." 52 The Chief Justice, by contrast, found nothing

45

Id. at 387. See, e.g., Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination,supra note 35, at

676 n.173, 695-97, 705-07.
46 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2622 (2006).
47
Id. at 2621.
48
Id. at 2622.
49

Id. at 2621, 2622, 2623.
Id. at 2623 (emphasis added).
51
1d. at 2616.
52 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2618.
50
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objectionable about District 25, deeming it adequate to offset what was done
53
in Laredo.
This disagreement makes little sense if, in fact, either Justice thought
invidious intent produced District. 23. The state could hardly "offset"
unconstitutional conduct in Laredo by creating District 25, whatever its
demographic and geographic contours.
The disagreement also suggests the Chief Justice subscribes to the core
tenets of Section 2. His conviction that District 25 was an adequate "offset"
assumes that Texas did something wrong in Laredo that needed to be offset.
The opinion thus implies that Chief Justice Roberts too would have ordered
the reconfiguration of the Laredo district had Texas failed to create what he
thought was an adequate substitute. The Chief Justice, moreover, read
Section 2 more expansively than the Court's majority when he argued against
saddling Section 2 plaintiffs with an additional burden of demonstrating
"cultural compactness," the novel concept Justice Kennedy used to discredit
54
District 25.

Chief Justice Roberts might easily have lodged more resistance to the
core of Justice Kennedy's analysis. He might have joined Justices Scalia and
55
Thomas, who argue that racial vote dilution is not judicially cognizable.
Alternatively, he might have narrowly read the elements of the Section 2
inquiry, as various lower courts have done, 56 and held that the totality of
circumstances failed to establish a statutory violation in Laredo.
That he declined to do so is as unexpected as Justice Kennedy's
identification of a Section 2 violation itself. A newfound readiness to
embrace proportional representation might be the explanation, but that hardly
seems likely. Instead, I think the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy embraced
Section 2 to the extent that they did in LULAC because of a simple fact:
elections in Laredo had been competitive prior to redistricting.
Had Texas not engaged in unprecedented "re-redistricting" in 2003,
Latino voters would have come to control the Laredo district as defined by
the boundaries set by the court-drawn districting plan adopted in 2001. 57
Congressman Bonilla would have lost his seat in 2004, and the district would
have remained safely majority-Latino and safely Democratic for the
remainder of the decade. Imagine for a moment, however, that the Laredo
district had already been safely majority-minority when Texas split the city in
2003. Would the Court have decided LULAC the same way?
Conventional doctrine, of course, suggests that the answer should be
yes, and that the plaintiffs' claim would have been stronger had Latino voters
53

Id. at 2661 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).

54

See Ortiz, supra note 2, at 48.
55 See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891-946 (1994) (Thomas J., concurring).
56 See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
57
LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2613.
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controlled the district prior to the challenged redistricting. The Laredo
plaintiffs claimed entitlement to a district that they did not control, even
though such control is often thought to be a prerequisite to a Section 2
claim. 58 They claimed, moreover, a denial of equal opportunity to participate,
notwithstanding the "marked and continuous rise in Spanish-surnamed voter
courts have equated with
registration," 59 a sign of political engagement lower
60
meaningful and adequate political participation.
For Justice Kennedy, neither the existence of competition nor the
political engagement it fostered diminished the plaintiffs' claim. He
emphasized that pre-existing control is not a necessary element of a
successful Section 2 claim, 6 1 and suggested that rising voter registration rates
sign that the
only strengthened the plaintiffs' claim by offering one
62
community was becoming "politically active" and engaged.
Liability under Section 2 hinges on many things, but a "politically
active" minority community has not previously been one of them. This
engagement nevertheless captured why the Court thought Texas injured
Latino voters when it split Laredo in 2003. The new line eliminated the
prospect that Latino voters might elect a representative of choice. This
prospect mattered precisely because it had been a prospect, that is, a
possibility, and not a certain result. This prospect of victory-not its
guarantee-was why Latino voters had been increasingly "politically active"
in Laredo. Eliminating this prospect was sure to eliminate the political
engagement it fostered. That's what I think Justice Kennedy meant when he
63
said the new district line "undermined the progress of a racial group."
Progress is not ensured victory but engaged participation. The
competitive nature of the Laredo district made this engagement possible, and
being politically engaged was what ultimately made the political influence of
Laredo's Latino voters worth protecting. It's also what distinguished them, in
the Court's eyes, from African-American voters in Fort Worth.
B. What's Wrong With Martin Frost?
LULAC's rejection of a Section 2 claim brought by African-Americans in
Fort Worth was, in one sense, unsurprising. Lower courts have long been
58 Cf Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (describing first
"precondition[]" to a Section 2 claim is that plaintiffs are sufficiently large to constitute a
majority in a single member district).
59
LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2621.
60
See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
61 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2615-21 (noting Latino voters had been "poised to elect
their candidate of choice," and that a group's failure to "win elections does not resolve the
issue of vote dilution").
62

Id. at 2621-22.

63

Id. at 2621.
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divided over the question of whether Section 2 protects minority interests in
coalition districts, districts where minority voters comprise less than half the
electorate but nevertheless control electoral outcomes. 64 The cross-racial
coalitions that define these districts highlight a breakdown of racially
polarized voting. This development might be fostered by according Section 2
protection to minority interests in coalition districts, but it also signals the
emergence of healthy political interactions among interest groups that might
appropriately be held to fall outside the ambit of Section 2.
The Court in LULAC was seemingly poised to hold that Section 2 does
not protect minority interests in coalition districts. 65 Justice Kennedy's
controlling opinion nevertheless left that question open, and instead resolved
the question presented by denying that the Fort Worth district dismantled in
66
2003 had been a true coalition district.
African-American voters in Fort Worth had constituted a majority of the
primary electorate in what had been a safely Democratic district. They
consistently voted for Martin Frost, an Anglo Democrat who repeatedly ran
unopposed in the primary and represented the district in Congress for nearly
thirty years. Justice Kennedy deemed these facts insufficient to make Frost
the African-American candidate of choice or establish that black voters
controlled his election. After all, the opinion posits, had "an AfricanAmerican candidate of choice" ever challenged Frost in the primary, white
and Latino voters might have participated in greater numbers. 67 The
assumption is that Frost would have prevailed in this circumstance, the
absence of black support notwithstanding, and consequently, that "Anglo
Democrats control[led] this district. '68
By imagining this "African-American candidate of choice," Justice
Kennedy posits that Frost might not have been the African-American
preferred candidate, even though black voters consistently voted for him in
the primary and general elections. The suggestion is that black voters in Fort
Worth would have supported someone other than Martin Frost, but did not,
because Frost would have defeated that candidate. The consequence, Justice
Kennedy maintains, is that we cannot be sure that Frost's dominance in the
district was necessarily the result of African-American control in Fort Worth.
Lower courts have long disagreed about whether the minority-preferred
candidate may be identified simply by identifying the candidate who receives
64 Compare Metts v. Murphy, 363 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2004); Rodriguez v. Pataki,
308 E Supp. 2d 346, 443 (S.D.N.Y 2004); Page v. Bartels, 144 F. Supp. 2d 346, 362
(D.N.J. 2001); Armour v. Ohio, 775 E Supp. 1044, 1059-60 (N.D. Ohio 1991); with Hall
v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 430 (4th Cir. 2004); Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1386
(6th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
65 See supra text following note 23.
66
LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2624-26.
67

Id.at 2625.

68

Id.at 2624 (quoting Session v. Perry, 298 E Supp. 2d 451, 483-84 (2004)).
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the most minority votes. Some courts hold that the inquiry should be limited
to election returns, 69 while others demand a more searching inquiry. This
latter approach, typically associated with the Third Circuit's decision in
Jenkins v. Red Clay School District,70 deems election results a preliminary

component of an inquiry that proceeds to examine the depth and vigor of
minority support for that candidate, the scope of that candidate's interest in
the minority community, whether and why a viable minority candidate did
71
not run, and whether minority candidates had run previously.

Martin Frost, of course, would have fared well under these additional
criteria. Not only did African-American voters consistently vote for him, but
considerable evidence presented in the district court suggested that black
support for Frost had been strong and stable. The state's own expert witness
testified that Frost was the black-preferred candidate. 72 Former Dallas mayor
Ron Kirk said that Frost "has gained a very strong base of support among
African-American[s]" and has "an incredible following and amount of
respect among the African-American community. '73 Justice Souter observed
in dissent that Frost "was strongly supported by minority voters after more
than two decades of sedulously considering minority interests," that the
NAACP ranked Frost's voting record higher than any other member of the
69 See, e.g., Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria, 160 F.3d 543, 552 (9th Cir. 1998)
(preferring "[a] bright-line rule... based on the premise 'that the ballot box provides the
best and most objective proxy for determining who constitutes a representative of
choice"' (internal citations omitted)); NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002,
1018 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[W]e believe that evaluating whether a person is, 'as a realistic
matter,' minority-preferred-based on subjective indicators such as 'anecdotal testimonial
evidence'-is a dubious judicial task, and one that can degenerate into racial stereotyping
of a high order.").
70 Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1129 (3d Cir.
1993).
71 See, e.g., id.at 1129 (finding that evidence showing non-minority candidate to be
minority-preferred includes minority "sponsorship" of the candidate, the level of attention
the candidate pays to the minority community, the level of minority turnout for white-onwhite elections compared to elections involving a minority candidate, the disincentives
minority candidates confront and difficulties they face in qualifying for office, and the
extent minority candidates have run in the past); Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303,
1321 (10th Cir. 1996) (adopting approach from Jenkins); Harvell v. Blytheville Sch. Dist.,
71 F.3d 1382, 1386 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating circuit will follow Third Circuit's approach in
Jenkins); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1540 (11th Cir. 1994) (requiring evidence of
strong preference before white candidate will be considered minority-preferred and
permitting such evidence to include anecdotal evidence, polling and turnout data, and a
review of appeals made during the campaign); Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d
976, 997-1017 (D.S.D. 2004) (considering anecdotal evidence such as the formation of
advocacy organizations, political parties targeting the minority group, get-out-the-vote
efforts, and politicians' testimony, as well as statistical evidence in determining cohesion
and bloc voting).
72
LULAC, 126 S.Ct. at 2650 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
73
Id.at 2651.
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Texas congressional delegation, and that Frost "was convincingly shown to
74
have been the 'chosen representative' of black voters in old District 24."
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the evidence "could signify [Frost] is
their candidate of choice. '7 5 He nevertheless thought the evidence
insufficient to displace the district court's contrary finding.7 6 In particular,
Justice Kennedy cited testimony from one witness that the district "was
drawn for an Anglo Democrat," 7 7 and testimony from another that "Anglo
Democrats [elected] in such 'influence districts' were not fully responsive to
78
the needs of the African-American community."
Justice Kennedy's deference to the trial court on this issue is far from
unprecedented, and would be of little note had the Fort Worth Section 2 claim
been the only question before the Court in LULAC. But the Court was also
considering the validity of the statewide partisan gerrymander and the
Section 2 claim raised in Laredo. Comparing the disposition of the Fort
Worth claim with the Court's disposition of those other issues suggests that
something more than simple deference to the fact finder was involved.
Prior to the challenged redistricting in Laredo, the Latino-preferred
candidate (identified implicitly in LULAC as the candidate for whom Latino
voters voted, and not by the more complex test used in Fort Worth),
consistently lost, and the district had long been represented by Henry Bonilla,
a candidate who received negligible Latino support. Prior to redistricting in
Fort Worth, the candidate black voters consistently supported in both the
primary and general election was repeatedly re-elected, and black voters
thought that candidate was a pretty good one, even if he might not have been
ideal in every respect. The 2003 redistricting shattered both the Laredo and
Fort Worth districts, but, LULAC holds, caused cognizable injury only to
Latino voters in Laredo.
Under conventional doctrine, the identification of a Section 2 violation
in Laredo says nothing about whether Latino voting strength in the preexisting district had been diluted. Instead, the finding of dilution signals that
Latino voting strength under the new district line fell short of what Latino
voting strength would be in some imagined district where the boundary line
was non-dilutive. 79 LULAC nevertheless celebrated Latino political
participation in Laredo prior to redistricting in a manner that suggests the
harm redistricting caused in Laredo was based not on some abstract,
imagined measure of undiluted Latino voting strength, but instead on the
voting strength Latino voters actually enjoyed in Laredo prior to
74

Id. at 2650-51.
75 Id. at 2624 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
76 Id.
77 ld. at 2624-25.
78
79

LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2625 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 479 (1997).
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redistricting. 80 That is, the Court held the new district to be dilutive precisely
because Latino political participation seemed so vibrant prior to redistricting.
In so doing, LULAC suggests that, prior to 2003, there was something about
81
Latino political participation in Laredo that was worth protecting.
The Court, by contrast, did not think African-American participation in
Fort Worth warranted similar protection. Prior to redistricting, the candidate
black voters supported in Fort Worth consistently won and actively promoted
their interests. After redistricting, black voters found themselves in various
Republican-dominated districts where they had no hope of influence. LULAC
nevertheless holds that the 2003 redistricting caused black voters no
cognizable harm under Section 2.
Why did Latino voters win in Laredo and African-American voters lose
in Fort Worth? I think the explanation lies in Justice Kennedy's imagined
"African-American candidate of choice." This hypothetical Fort Worth
candidate was the one who would prompt Anglo and Latino voters to turn out
to ensure Frost's victory. 82 This hypothetical scenario captures why we
cannot be sure Frost was genuinely minority preferred: Frost was perennially
unopposed. The Fort Worth district was not only safely Democratic, it was
safely Martin Frost's district, with the absence of competition seeping into
the primary itself. And, of course, the district was drawn precisely for that
purpose. As Justice Kennedy properly reminds us, Frost himself was the
"architect" behind the 1991 Democratic gerrymander to which the
83
Republicans' 2003 foray into re-redistricting was largely a response.
In this sense, Martin Frost was the Democratic Henry Bonilla, and the
Fort Worth district was the product of the same form of incumbency
protection that Justice Kennedy found to be problematic in Laredo. As a
matter of traditional doctrine, of course, this parallel has no bearing on the
question of whether either district gave rise to racial vote dilution. And yet,
the role of partisan gerrymandering and specifically incumbency protection
in the creation of each district was crucial to Justice Kennedy's analysis of
dilution in each location.
Incumbency protection, as pursued in Laredo, destroyed what made the
Latino community there worth protecting-hence, Justice Kennedy's
repeated references to Laredo's energetic, cohesive, "politically active"
Latino community. 84 The prospect of defeating Bonilla mobilized Laredo's
Latino voters, while the redistricting plan eliminated that prospect and the
political engagement it engendered. In Fort Worth, incumbency protection
prevented the district from becoming a forum in which such an engaged
community might emerge. Propelling Justice Kennedy's skepticism that
80

See supranotes 34, 47-49 and accompanying text.
81 See supraPart II.A.
82
LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2624-25.
83
Id.at 2605.
84
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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African-American voters truly preferred Frost was the conviction that the
Fort Worth district, created by Martin Frost for Martin Frost, was not an
environment in which a meaningful preference for a political candidate could
be expressed and, consequently, where a vibrant political community could
arise and flourish.
The 2003 districting plan shattered Martin Frost's district and scattered
African-American voters from that district among several surrounding
districts, where no prospect for black (Democratic) influence existed. In
Justice Kennedy's controlling view, the type of political participation the new
districts offered, poor as it was, was no worse than the type of participation to
which black voters claimed an entitlement, namely the type of participation
that had been available in what Justice Kennedy properly saw as Martin
Frost's fiefdom. Measuring dilution against that benchmark, LULAC finds
that the new districting plan caused black voters no injury under Section 2.
By granting relief in Laredo but not in Fort Worth, LULAC suggests that
Section 2 protects minority interests in competitive districts but not in
noncompetitive ones. This suggested link between racial vote dilution and
competitive elections is a radical one. Were the Court to develop it, LULAC
will have launched a fundamentally new approach to minority political
participation. The present focus on electoral outcomes will be replaced with
an inquiry more concerned with the process that produces those outcomes.
The focus on electoral outcomes stems primarily from the Supreme
Court's decision twenty years ago in Thornburg v. Gingles.85 The Court in
Gingles sought to resolve disagreement among lower courts regarding the
application of the 1982 amendment to Section 2,86 and clarify the
circumstances under which Section 2 liability exists. Specifically addressing
the question whether a challenged multimember districting plan diluted black
vote strength, Gingles distilled three "preconditions" to a Section 2 claim:
plaintiffs must demonstrate, first, that the minority group is sufficiently large
and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single member
district; second, that the group is politically cohesive; and third, that the white
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to defeat the minority-preferred
87
candidate.
The Gingles preconditions critically inform the question of liability
under Section 2. Satisfying these conditions does not itself establish a
Section 2 violation, but plaintiffs who successfully traverse the Gingles
threshold typically prevail, 8 8 and those who cannot almost always find their
85
86

478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).

See GROFMAN, HANDLEY & NIEMI, supra note 22, at 42-49 (1992).
87 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50.
88 See Katz, Documenting Discrimination,supra note 35, at 660 (finding that, of the
published Section 2 decisions since 1982, courts in 68 lawsuits found the preconditions to
be satisfied, and that 57 of these lawsuits proceeded to outcomes favorable to the
plaintiffs).
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case at an end. 89 The Gingles framework accordingly identifies
circumstances likely to give rise to liability under Section 2.90 The decision
does not, however, mandate any specific remedy for racial vote dilution once
assessed. Thus, while Gingles specifically calls on plaintiffs to demonstrate
that a compact majority-minority district might be drawn, it does not hold
that the majority-minority district is the exclusive or even the preferred
remedy for racial vote dilution under Section 2. As Judge Heaney recently
observed, "the Gingles preconditions are designed to establish liability, and
not a remedy." 9 1
Gingles has nevertheless been understood as setting forth just such a
mandate, 9 2 and the framework certainly invites the creation of majorityminority districts. 93 And for good reason. Such districts offer a remedy for
racial vote dilution, at least as it has been traditionally understood, and offer
a venue that may itself erode racial polarization among voters. 94 When voting
is racially polarized, these districts enable minority voters to elect candidates
of choice when doing so would not otherwise have been possible. Some have
also argued that a minority presence in the legislature encourages minority
voter turnout, 95 and, at least in some circumstances, yields policies more

favorable to minority interests than would otherwise be produced. 96 Majorityminority districts ensure a constant, rather than sporadic, minority legislative
presence, which allows minority legislators to accumulate seniority, and
makes complete minority exclusion from important legislative deals less
likely.97
89 See Katz, DocumentingDiscrimination,supra note 35, at 660.
90 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51.
91 See Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 461 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2006).
92
See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED
HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 294 (2000) ("[Gingles] served as a

mandate, for state lawmakers as well as Justice Department officials engaged in the
preclearance process, to create 'majority-minority' voting districts in cities and states that
contained sizable minority populations and had a record of racially polarized voting.").
93
1d. at 294 ("[Gingles] encouraged both the lower courts and the Justice
Department to promote single-member and 'minority opportunity' districts in the
numerous locales where the Gingles criteria were met.").
94
See, e.g., CANON, supra note 16, at 204-05, 261.
95

See, e.g., KATHERINE TATE, FROM PROTEST TO POLITICS: THE NEW BLACK VOTERS

IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 81 (1993); Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up ": Minority
PoliticalParticipationand Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 449, 501
(1988). Cf LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 68, 85 (1994); Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, 1990s
Issues in Voting Rights, 65 MISS. L.J. 205, 268-69 (1995).
96 See Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a
Century, 50 VAND. L. REv. 291, 302-07 (1997).
97 See Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression ofRetrogression,
3 ELECTION L.J. 21, 30 (2004).
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Majority-minority districts are invariably also noncompetitive districts,
given that minority voters typically vote for Democratic candidates. As
LULAC suggests, these districts offer a form of political participation that is
less than optimal, even absent the racial considerations that prompted the
Court to describe them as "second best."' 98 Particularly where the absence of
competition seeps into the Democratic primary, a noncompetitive district
becomes a forum unlikely to generate the engagement and vibrancy Justice
Kennedy thought had been manifest in Laredo. Such districts are more likely
to function as places where "true" minority and majority preferences cannot
be discerned, as the Court found to be the case in the protectorate Martin
Frost created for himself in Fort Worth.
LULAC, of course, did not directly call into question the privileged status
of the majority-minority district under Section 2. Martin Frost's Fort Worth
district was notably not such a district, and had it been, then perhaps, the
district's elected representative might be deemed minority-preferred, the
absence of competition notwithstanding. Still, such a judgment requires
implicit assumptions about African-American political cohesion that the
absence of competition renders untestable. Justice Kennedy, in particular, is
99
likely to be skeptical about making such assumptions.
If so, LULAC casts doubt on the continued viability of the majorityminority district as a preferred form of minority representation. Through its
resolution of the Laredo and Fort Worth claims, LULAC suggests that the
circumstances that presently entitle (or at least enable) minority voters to
secure representation in majority-minority districts may not suffice for long.
That development is cause for concern, but nevertheless one that may
well be worth welcoming. The Roberts Court, like the Rehnquist and Burger
Courts before it, was never going to embrace wholesale the majorityminority district and the race-based districting moves its generation requires.
By privileging a competitive process over a guaranteed outcome, the Court in
LULAC was able to identify for the first time specific conduct that runs afoul
of Section 2. In so doing, the Court identified at least one racially-defined
community that warrants statutory protection, and thereby affirmed the
principle that jurisdictions must respect some racially-defined communities
when they draw district lines. The invalidation of the Laredo district
necessarily implies that we must not only "account for the differences
between people of the same race," 10 0 but we must respect their similarities as
well. Race need not be a predicament from which we must escape, but may

98 Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) (noting that such districts rely
on "the 'politics of second best') (quoting BERNARD GROFMAN, LISA HANDLEY &
RICHARD NIEMI, MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 136

(1992)); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
99

See supranote 41.

100 LULAC, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2618 (2006).
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instead function as a quality that gives rise to valued communities that, at
least in certain circumstances, warrant our protection.
That, of course, may simply be another way of saying that racial vote
dilution is a cognizable harm-hardly a revolutionary proposition. LULAC
nevertheless makes clear that Justice Kennedy subscribes to it. So apparently
do the Court's two newest justices, whom, through Chief Justice Roberts'
opinion, suggested that absent District 25 as an "offset," redistricting caused
Latino voters in Laredo actionable injury under Section 2.101 That leaves only
Justices Scalia and Thomas who deny that racial vote dilution is even
something courts can remedy.
LULAC embraced Section 2 to the extent that it did by privileging
process over outcome. It cast doubt on traditional efforts to shield cohesive
minority groups from political competition. This move comes at some cost,
given that the benefits majority-minority districts presently secure for
minority voters may no longer be secure. At the same time, however, the
move suggests not only that Section 2 itself may retain vitality in the Roberts
Court, but that it might function as a catalyst for a different, and better, form
of political participation. LULAC's sense that Latino voters in Laredo lost
something worth protecting, but that African-American voters in Fort Worth
did not, signals the Court's inclination to favor engagement over security. It
suggests that the Court might ultimately insist that the right to vote
encompass something more than casting a ballot for a preordained victor. As
such, LULAC not only promises to restructure opportunities for minority
political participation, but also offers a nascent conception of political harm
suffered by voters regardless of race when a political system is rigged to
block competition. That is, if Justice Kennedy looks carefully, he may just
find in Laredo and Fort Worth the standard he has been seeking to manage
claims of partisan gerrymandering.
III. RETHINKING PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
Twenty-one years ago Justice O'Connor told us not to worry about
partisan gerrymandering. Concurring in Davis v. Bandemer,10 2 she suggested
that political parties are not able to secure significant partisan advantage in
the districting process because "political gerrymandering is a self-limiting
enterprise."' 10 3 Her premise was that maximizing overall party success
requires party candidates to win individual seats by the narrowest margin
possible. A party engaged in an "overambitious" partisan gerrymander will
inevitably cut the margin too close, lose some seats, and ultimately lose its
majority. Alternatively, that party's incumbents will resist efforts to make
101 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
102 478 U.S. 109 (1986).

103 Id. at 152

(O'Connor, J.,concurring)

REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 151-59 (1984)).

(citing BRUCE E. CAIN, THE
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safe seats more competitive and will block the gerrymander before it can be
O'Connor wrote, will keep aggressive
imposed. Either occurrence, Justice
04
partisan gerrymandering in check.1
As LULAC makes clear, things have not turned out quite as Justice
O'Connor predicted. In one sense, of course, she prevailed. She characterized
political gerrymandering as "self-limiting" back in Davis v. Bandemer to
buttress her core belief that claims of partisan gerrymandering ought not to be
justiciable. Five justices have yet to subscribe to that proposition in a single
case, but the principle has been law for all practical purposes since Davis
itself. The inability of any litigant to establish unconstitutional partisan
of such claims, pesky
gerrymandering means that the nominal justiciability
05
1
consequence.
practical
limited
of
is
be,
may
it
as
But while governing law comports with Justice O'Connor's preference,
districting practices have not played out as she anticipated. Of the
redistricting plans adopted after the 2000 census, partisan gerrymanders
abound, 10 6 many extreme in nature and perhaps none as remarkable as the
one challenged in LULAC itself. Far from "self-limiting," partisan
gerrymandering has become a pervasive and ever-expanding enterprise. So
much so that when the Court revisited Davis in its 2004 decision Fieth v.
Jubelirer,10 7 Justice O'Connor could no longer claim that regulation of the
practice was unnecessary. Instead, she joined Justice Scalia's plurality
nevertheless
opinion, which acknowledged the severity of the problem,10but
8
insisted that the remedy was not to be found with the Court.
Justice O'Connor erred in Davis by assuming that an "overambitious"
partisan gerrymander required districts that verge on competitive. As it turns
out, the party that controls the districting process can ensure its candidates
easy victory while still maximizing overall party influence. All that is needed
is the willingness to employ a host of fairly audacious, and, at present,
perfectly legal districting moves. 10 9 That is precisely what the Republican104 Id.
supra note 13, at 886 ("Bandemer has served
almost exclusively as an invitation to litigation without much prospect of redress.").
10 6 See Issacharoff& Karlan, supra note 2.
107 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
10 8 See id. at 292 (plurality opinion) (noting that "We do not disagree" with "the
105

See, e.g.,

ISSACHAROFF ET AL.,

judgment" that "severe partisan gerrymanders [are incompatible] with democratic
principles" and stating that the case presented the question of justiciability, not "whether
severe partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution"). See also id. at 317 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that partisan gerrymanders that disfavor one
party are impermissible and deeming it "unfortunate" that legislators now view the
districting process as a means to "rig[] elections.") (internal citation omitted); id. at 345
(Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that "the increasing efficiency of partisan redistricting has
damaged the democratic process to a degree that our predecessors only began to
imagine").
109 See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 2, at 551-53.
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controlled Texas government did back in 2003, when it insulated vulnerable
Republican incumbents like Henry Bonilla and shattered the security
previously enjoyed by Democrats like Martin Frost.
Congress, of course, could outlaw districting plans of this sort, but it will
not, just as it did not remedy malapportionment a half-century ago."I 0 The
consequence is that partisan gerrymandering will persist until the Court puts
a stop to it. But while the need for judicial action is compelling, the Justices
rightly turned back the challenges brought against the statewide
gerrymanders in Vieth and LULAC. In both cases, the plaintiffs objected not
to the insulation of Republican incumbents per se but to the concurrent
failure of the districting plans to leave "enough" Democratic legislators in
power. The core claim, simply put, was that the gerrymanders left the
Democratic Party with insufficient power. The Justices balked at this
contention, not so much because they disagreed with it, but because they
were nonplussed as to how the Court could remedy it. Just how much power
should Democrats in Texas have anyway? The Justices have never been
comfortable assessing the appropriate level of representation to which any
group might demand an entitlement.
The Court overcame, or more precisely, bypassed this discomfort when it
struck down the Laredo district as dilutive under Section 2. In the majority's
view, the Latino plaintiffs were claiming an entitlement not to a particular
electoral outcome, but instead to a particular sort of electoral process, one
that allowed them a fair opportunity to compete. The Fort Worth plaintiffs, by
contrast, seemed much more like the Democrats challenging the statewide
plan, with political participation in Fort Worth prior to redistricting
resembling what was possible in Laredo afterward. That observation
underlies the disposition of both the Laredo and Fort Worth claims, and
propels LULAC's redefinition of racial vote dilution. It also suggests that, far
from a distraction, the Section 2 claims in LULAC may ultimately be the
source of a means to manage partisan gerrymandering. More workable than
the one the plaintiffs presented in either Vieth or LULAC, this approach
insists on a vibrant political process as opposed to securing an "equitable"
outcome.
Justice Kennedy deemed the effort to insulate Representative Bonilla
flawed because it was meant "to benefit the officeholder, not the voters," and
he thought what had been going on in Fort Worth prior to 2003 was no
different. This distinction between benefits to voters and those to
officeholders is underdeveloped, but the suggestion seems to be that
incumbency protection should promote responsiveness rather than stifle
competition. That is an intriguing idea. Voters should be able to re-elect
representatives who serve them well, and Justice Kennedy rightly
appreciated that Texas was up to something else when it split Laredo in 2003.

110 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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In future cases, the Court may seek to operationalize this distinction
between good and bad forms of incumbency protection, and better explain
how we might identify when these efforts benefit voters, as opposed to
officeholders. I would welcome such an effort. Still, I think an approach
easier to administer and more robust in effect would be to return to the rule
set forth in Karcher v. Daggett-the often-cited source of the mantra that
incumbency protection is a legitimate districting goal. Karcher itself
condoned not the protection of incumbents writ large, but instead a far more
restricted desire to draw district lines so as to avoid contests between
incumbents.
IV.CONCLUSION

The New York Times published an editorial the day after the Court
decided LULAC v. Perry complaining that the Justices "did little to ensure the
vibrancy of American democracy" and, while the Court "rightly" struck
down the Laredo district, it "did not begin to address the serious problems
with the 2003 redistricting."'I'I I think that is wrong. Striking down the
statewide gerrymander -because it purportedly gave Republicans too many
safe seats would have done nothing to make Texan or American democracy
more "vibrant." Indeed, the Democratic plaintiffs did not seek vibrancy, but
instead, a greater share of the districting spoils. Striking down the Laredo
district, by contrast, on the grounds that the Court did was indeed an
important step, one that may well begin to address the excesses of
partisanship in the political process.
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